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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MERRILL B. ANDERSON, 
DOROTHY M. ANDERSON and 
RALPH BITNER MORRIS, 
Pe t i t i one r s , 
- vs -
CAPITOL THRIFT AND LOAN 
COMPANY, JAMES B. MASON, 
a s T r u s t e e , and MIDVALLEY 
INVESTMENT, 
Respondents . 
Case No 
14144 
IJa" 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
STATEMENT OF THE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an act ion to review a Summary Judgment of the 
Third Dis t r i c t Cour t , Judge Stewart M. Hanson, J r . , p res id ing , 
awarded to the Respondent, Midvalley Investment , on the 10th 
day of Apr i l , 1975. This is a l so an act ion to review an o rde r of 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, S r . , of the s ame Cour t , requi r ing the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Petitioners to remove from their home, dated April 18, 1975, 
which order was based upon the Summary Judgment afore-
mentioned. . ",' * \ 
DISPOSITION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
The Respondent, Midvalley Investment, filed a motion 
for a summary judgment before the Law and Motion Division of 
the Third District Court. The motion was heard and argued on 
the 18th day of February, 1975. The other Respondents also 
argued for the motion and were represented by Attorney Robert B. 
Merr i l l . The Third District Court, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, J r . , 
presiding, granted the motion on the 10th day of April, 1975. 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. , at a subsequent hearing, awarded 
the Respondents the sum of $300.00 in judgment and required the 
Petitioners to remove from the premises by the 10th day of May, 
1975. The counterclaim and other claims of the Respondents were 
dismissed. ; 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL l 
That the Summary Judgment heretofore issued by the Third 
District Court be removed and the matter removed to the Third 
District Court for t r ia l and that that part of Judge Hanson, Sr. ! s 
order to have the Petitioners remove from their home be vacated 
until t r ia l inasmuch as it is based on the Summary Judgment. In 
2 
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the alternative, that the Court determine that the alleged sale 
was inequitable and improper; and also in violation of the 
statute 57-1-27 and 52-1-28 and order the Trustee to notice the 
property up for resale according to the tenor and language of the 
aforementioned statutes. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Petitioners herein are all residents of Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. They are the owners of three 
separate parcels of property located in Salt Lake City, more part i-
cularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 
4, Block 161, Plat "D", Salt Lake City 
Survey, and running thence East 55 feet; 
thence South 165 feet; thence West 55 feet; 
thence North 165 feet to the place of beginning. 
ALSO: 
PARCEL 1: Commencing at the Northwest 
corner of Lot 8, Block 28, Plat " F " , Salt 
Lake City Survey and running thence South 
40. 5 feet; thence West 130 feet; thence 
North 40. 5 feet; thence East 130 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: Commencing at a point 40.5 feet 
South of the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block 
28, Plat "F" , Salt Lake City Survey, and run-
ning thence South 36 feet; thence West 130 
feet; thence North 36 feet; thence East 130 feet 
to the place of beginning. 
3 
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;, : The first legal description above describes the home in 
which the Petitioners live, the address of which is 474 East 12th 
Avenue, Salt Lake City. Parcels 1 and 2 describe an apartment 
house with several apartments, located at 246 South 11th East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The total appraised value of these properties 
is approximately $179,000.00. 
On July 30, 1973, the Petitioners borrowed from the 
Respondent, Capitol Thrift and Loan Company, the total sum of 
$31, 000.00. On the same day, said Petitioners signed two Trust 
Deeds covering their property above-described. These deeds 
were duly recorded by the Salt Lake City Recorder on August 1, 
1973, Page 64, Book 3385 and Page 61, Book 3385, respectively. 
On December 21, 1973, the Petitioners borrowed $32,496.00 
from the same Respondent. The proceeds from this loan paid 
off the former loan. Again, two separate Deeds of Trust were 
signed by the Petitioners and were duly recorded in Salt Lake City 
Recorder 's office on December 28, 1973, Page 157, Book 3487 
and Page 160, Book 3487, respectively. 
Respondent, James B. Mason, was appointed trustee on 
all of the Trust Deeds above-mentioned by the Respondent, Capitol 
Thrift and Loan Company. 
4 
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Petitioners, through business reversals , were unable 
to make the payments under the loan agreement and defaulted 
upon the same. The default of the Petitioners was duly entered 
by the trustee and the three-month redemption period expired 
as is allowed under 57-1-24, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The 
trustee then prepared to sell the property, but was temporarily 
stopped by an order of the Third District Court as a result of a 
suit commenced by the Petit ioners. This lawsuit, Case No. 
223415, was settled by stipulation between the parties and on 
November 25, 1974, the case was dismissed. 
The Trustee then published the property for sale accord-
ing to 57-1-25 on January 16, 1975 and stated that the sale would 
take place "at public auction, to the highest bidder, for cash 
(emphasis added) in lawful money of the United States, all payable 
at the time of sale . . . ff (See Trustee 's Notice, Exhibit ffCff 
attached to Affidavit of James Mason). Both of the Petitioners have 
stated that they thought this meant that cash had to be available at 
the time of the sale. (See Affidavits of Dorothy M. Anderson and 
Merri l l B. Anderson.) 
At the alleged sale, there were only two bidders, the 
Respondent Beneficiary under the Deed of Trust, Capitol Thrift and 
Loan Company and the Respondent, Midvalley Investment. Midvalley 
5 
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made the highest bid of $36 ,750 .00; however, did not have cash 
avai lable . It was not until the next day that Respondent, Midvalley 
Inves tment , del ivered the bid p r i ce to the T r u s t e e , in the form 
of a check.
 tl , . . . - . , , , , . • -. . . . . ,.« 
According to the affidavits of the Pe t i t i one r s , M r s . Anderson 
did not attend because she thought cash was n e c e s s a r y at the t ime 
of sale as per the Notice . (See affidavit of Dorothy M. Anderson . ) 
M r . Anderson did not appear because he was unable to find the 
locat ion. However, M r . Anderson did meet an officer of Respondent, 
Midvalley Investment , M r . M e r l i n Hanks, who told him no money 
had changed hands at the sale and the bidder at the sale had been 
given 24 hours to come up with the money. That if the Pe t i t ione r s 
could come up with the money before that t i m e , he would accept it, 
and hoped they could. (See affidavit of M e r r i l l B . Ander son . ) 
M r . L a r r y Hill , a r ea l es ta te inves tor , contacted the Respon-
dent, Capitol Thrift and Loan Company, on the morning of the 17th 
of J anua ry , 1975, with a view to buying and bidding on the p roper ty . 
(See affidavit of L a r r y Hil l) . He was told by the said Respondent 
that the p roper ty had been sold and he could not bid upon the p roper ty . 
Pe t i t ioner , Dorothy M. Anderson, s t a t e s she would have 
appeared to bid on the p roper ty had she known "cash on the spot" 
was not n e c e s s a r y . Respondent, Capitol Thrift and Loan Company, 
6 
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had advised her that the purchaser at the sale would have to 
pay cash at the time of the sale. (See affidavit of Dorothy M. 
Anderson.) In addition to this, said Petitioners1 s ister, Barbara 
M. Nelson, made an offer on the property on the morning of 
January 16, 1975, but was advised by Respondent, Capitol Thrift 
and Loan Company, that she had to come up with the money !,in 
the next 20 minutes". (See affidavit of Dorothy M. Anderson.) 
According to the affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent for 
the Respondent, Midvalley Investment, they did not have the cash 
at the time of the sale on January 16, 1975, and that by prior 
arrangement with the Respondent Trustee, James Mason, he knew 
they did not have cash for the properties at the time of the sale. 
(See affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent.) No ncash ! l changed 
hands on the day at which the sale had been noticed up. (emphasis 
added.) 
It was not until 11:55 a .m. on the 17th of January, 1975 
that Respondent, James Mason, accepted a check from Midvalley 
Investment (see affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent), after he had 
refused to accept a bid from Messers Belnap and Doxey at 11:30 
a .m. of the same morning. (See affidavit of Mr. Doxey, item 14.) 
This was also after the Respondent, Capitol Thrift and Loan Company, 
had turned down bids from Mr. Hill and Mrs . B. M. Nelson. 
7 
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Subsequent to the t r i a l of this case before Stewart M. 
Hanson, S r . , the Pe t i t ioners he re in have tendered the $300.00 
judgment to the Respondent, Midvalley. Midvalley has refused 
the s a m e . . / " • , . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN ORDER TO BE AWARDED A SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
THE MOVING PARTY HAS TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO 
"GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND THAT THE 
MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT A S A MATTER 
OF LAW. THIS THE RESPONDENT, MIDVALLEY INVESTMENT, 
FAILED TO DO. 
The per t inent law with r e g a r d s to s u m m a r y judgments in 
the State of Utah is found under the Utah Rules of Civil P rodedure 
at Rule 56. Subsection (c) of that rule s ta tes a s follows: 
(c) Motion and Proceed ings Thereon . The motion 
shal l be se rved at l eas t 10 days before the t ime 
fixed for the hear ing . The adve r se par ty p r i o r to 
the day of hear ing may se rve opposing affidavits. 
The judgment sought shal l be r endered forthwith 
if the pleadings, deposi t ions, and admiss ions on 
file, toge ther with the affidavits, if any, show that 
t he re is no genuine i ssue as to any m a t e r i a l fact 
and that the moving par ty is entit led to a judgment 
as a m a t t e r of law. A s u m m a r y judgment, i n t e r -
locutory in c h a r a c t e r , may be r endered on the 
i s sue of l iabil i ty alone although the re i s a genuine 
i ssue as to the amount of damages , (emphasis added) 
8 
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This Cour t , in in terpre t ing the above rule, has s t r ic t ly held 
that the moving par ty in a motion for s u m m a r y judgment must 
c a r r y the burden of showing n that the re is no genuine i ssue a s to 
any ma te r i a l fact and that the moving par ty is entitled to a judgment 
as a ma t t e r of law". See In re Wi l l i ams ' E s t a t e s , 10 U. (2d) 83, 
348 P . 2d 683, 685; Reliable F u r n i t u r e Co. v. Fidel i ty & Guaranty 
Ins . Unde rwr i t e r s , 16 U. (2d) 211, 398 P . 2d 685; Diamond T, Utah, 
Inc. v. T r a v e l e r s Indemnity C o . , 21 U. (2d) 124, 441 P . 2d 705; 
Willden v. Kennecott Copper C o r p . , 25 U. (2d) 96, 476 P . 2d 687; 
Young v. Fe lo rn ia , 121 U. 646, 244 P . 2d 862; Bullock v. Deser t 
Dodge Truck Center , I n c . , 11 U. (2d) 1, 354 P . 2d 559; Tanner v. 
Utah Poul t ry and F a r m e r s Co-op, 11 U. (2d) 353, 359 P . 2d 18; 
F r e d e r i c k May & C o . , I n c . , v. Dunn, 13 U. (2d) 40, 368 P . 2d 266; 
Robinson v. Robinson, 16 U. (2d) 2, 394 P . 2d 876; 
Not only has this Court enforced a very s t r i c t in terpre ta t ion 
of Rule 56 (c), it has indicated its re luctance to invoke its r emedy . 
In Brandt v. Springville Banking C o . , 10 U. (2d) 350, 353 P . 2d 460, 
th is Court said: '" - ^ t * • . < • . . • 
F o r the r ea son that a Summary Judgment prevents 
l i t igants from fully present ing the i r case to the Cour t , 
cour t s a r e , and should be, re luctant to invoke th is 
r emedy . 
The above language was followed in Reliable F u r n i t u r e C o . , 
9 
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v. Fidelity & Garantee Ins. Underwriters (Supra) when this Court 
outlined the purpose of the said Rule.
 4 . 
The sole purpose of Summary Judgment is to bar 
from the courts unnecessary and unjustified litiga-
, tion, and only where it clearly appears that the 
party against whom the judgment would be granted 
, cannot possibly establish a right to recover should 
such judgment be granted. Any doubts should be 
resolved in favor of such party when summary 
judgment against him is being considered. 
(emphasis added) 
The above case followed Thompson v. Ford Motor Co. , 
16 U. (2d) 30, 395 P . 2d 62, which held the same. 
It is clear then, that if there were disputed material facts, 
or if as a matter of law the Respondent, Midvalley Investment, 
couldn't recover, then the judgment of the Third District Court 
should be reversed. 
There are some vital issues of fact and law which are material 
to Petitioners1 case, which are in dispute. They are as follows: 
t r>J, A) Respondent Trustee, James Mason, states he never, at 
any time, received an offer from the Petitioners on the property. 
(See Affidavit of James Mason, Page 2, Paragraph 8.) But the 
affidavit of Messers Doxey and Belnap indicate that said Trustee 
refused to accept any offers. (See affidavit of David Doxey, item 14.) 
B) The affidavit of Petitioners, Merri l l B. and Dorothy M. 
Anderson, indicate that offers on the property were made to 
10 
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Capitol Thrift and Loan Company, and a l so that said Respondent 
refused said offers and declined them indicating that "cash" was 
needed at the sa l e . These facts a r e undisputed. 
C) The affidavit of M r . Hill a l so indicates s imi l a r 
d issuas ion from bidding on the p roper ty by the Respondent, Capitol 
Thrift and Loan. This affidavit was undisputed. 
D) F u r t h e r , the affidavit of Pe t i t ioner , Dorothy M. Anderson, 
indicates that an agreement set t l ing Pe t i t ioners 1 delinquency had 
been reached with Respondent, Capitol Thrift and Loan, on January 
9, 1975. These al legations were a l so undisputed. 
It is c l ea r that the Third Dis t r ic t Court took the position 
that the contacts between Pe t i t ioners and the Respondent, Capitol 
Thrift and Loan, were immate r i a l , and as long a s the Trus tee 
was not a d i rec t par ty to them, they a r e not m a t e r i a l . 
Pe t i t ioners urge this Court to r e v e r s e th is position for the 
following r e a s o n s : 
A) In a Trus t Deed sa le , the Trus t ee must r ep resen t both 
pa r t i e s and do equity. 
B) The t r u s t ee is the apointee and, the re fo re , the agent of 
the beneficiary. 
C) It would be inequitable for the beneficiary to be guilty 
of ac ts which hindered the bidding at the sa le , and then hide behind 
11 
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the fiction that because Trustee acted as a third party, the sale 
was valid,, ' .•;•• - ; P !.• ;:.f,.-: •;.•/,..; b — v- ! ; v » | ; 
D) The intent of Title 57-1-19 and sequel is to allow the 
Trustor as great a recovery as possible by having as many bidders 
at the sale as possible. Actions by the beneficiary discouraging 
bids after the sale was continued 24 hours, frustrated the intent 
of the statute and was inequitable to the Trustors. 
It is the contention of the Petitioners that the law requires 
equity in the sale and that for the reasons stated in Points 2 through 
5 below enumerated, not only were there material issues of fact in 
dispute; but that the moving party, Respondent, Mid valley Investment, 
was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the 
summary judgment of the Third District Court should be refersed. 
POINT II 
THE ALLEGED SALE HELD ON JANUARY 16, 1975 WAS 
IMPROPER UNDER 57-1-28 AS THE SALE WAS NOT CONSUMMAT-
ED FORTHWITH. 
Section 57-1-28 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in its 
pertinent parts, states as follows: 
57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee - Payment of 
:
 bid - Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser - Recitals -
Effect. - - (1) The purchaser at the sale shall forthwith 
• pay the price bid and upon receipt of payment the trustee 
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shall execute and deliver his deed to such q 
purchaser. The t rustee 's deed may contain 
recitals of compliance with the requirements of 
this act relating to the exercise of the power of 
sale and sale of the property described therein, 
including recitals concerning any mailing, per-
sonal delivery and publication of the notice of 
default, any mailing and the publication and post-
ing of notice of sale, and the conduct of sale; 
and such recitals shall constitute prima facie 
evidence of such compliance and conclusive 
evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers 
and encumbrancers for value and without notice. 
(emphasis added) 
The Petitioners know of no decisions of this Court inter-
preting this particular statute. However, it has been interpreted 
in other jurisdictions as follows: 
r e . Application of County 
Collector, 266 N. E. 2d 383, 387. 
Term "Forthwith" within Revenue Act providing 
that person purchasing any tract or lot shall v 
forthwith pay collector amount charged and that 
purchase will be void if purchaser fails to com-
plete same, means that purchaser at a tax sale 
must make payment on date of sale; thus when 
payment is made after date of sale, sale and 
orders based thereon are voidable and subject 
to direct attack. 
Dettmer v. Mayo, F l a . , 61 So. 2d 192, 194 
The words "Forthwith" and "thereupon" when used 
with reference to time are generally construed to 
mean without delay or lapse of t ime. *, 
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Above followed in Bottle Min. and Mill. Co. v. Kern, 99 
p. 994, 996, Lewis v. Hojer, 16, N.Y.S. 534, 536; Harbel Oil Co. 
v. Steele, 298 p. 2d 789, 791, 80 Ariz. 368; Sheldon v. Steele, 87 
N.W. 683, 685, 114 Iowa 616. ;:.. ••.—•.' 
tc
 According to the facts as contained in both the affidavits of 
Respondent Trustee, James Mason, and Respondent, Midvalley 
Investment, indicate that the bid price was not paid "Forthwith" 
under the meaning of the cases above. That is , no money changed 
hands at the time and place of the sale. In fact, it was not until 
24 hours later that the sale took place. This gives rise to another 
disputed fact. The Trustee claims that the sale took place on the 
16th day of January, 1975. (See affidavit of James Mason, Trustee.) 
The Petitioners urge that under the language of 57-1-27, the 
Trustee, in fact, and as a matter of law, postponed the sale for 
24 hours. The section in question reads as follows: 
-; t 57-1-27. Sale of trust property by trustee - Pulbic 
j auction - Conduct by attorney for trustee - Trustor 
may direct order in which trust property sold - Bids 
- Postponement of sale. - - On the date and at the time 
and place designated in the notice of sale, the trustee 
shall sell the property at public auction to the highest 
bidder. The attorney for the trustee may conduct 
the sale and act at such sale as the auctioneer for 
the t rus tee . The trustor , or his successor in interest, 
•' ' * if present at the sale, may direct the order in which 
the trust property shall be sold when such property 
consists of several known lots or parcels which can 
be sold to advantage separately and the trustee shall 
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follow such directions. Any person, including the 
beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Every bid shall 
be deemed an irrevocable offer, and if the pur-
chaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the 
property struck off to him at the sale, the trustee 
may again sell the property at any time to the highest 
K bidder. The party refusing to pay shall be liable 
for any loss occasioned thereby and the trustee may 
also, in his discretion, thereafter reject any other 
bid of such person. 
The person conducting the sale may, for any cause 
he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and, in every such 
case, notice of postponement shall be given by public 
declaration thereof by such person at the time and 
place last appointed for the sale. No other notice of 
the postponed sale need be given unless the sale is 
postponed for longer than one day beyond the day de-
signated in the notice of sale in which event notice 
thereof shall be given in the same manner as the 
original notice of sale is required to be given. 
(emphasis added) 
There is no record as to the language used by the Trustee 
at the time of the alleged sale; but his actions in not accepting the 
money of Midvalley Investment until 24 hours later, and allowing 
them to bring it in later, and the statement of Capitol Thrift and 
Loan's officer, who had been at the sale, to Petitioner, Merrill B. 
Anderson, shortly after the sale, that no money had changed hands 
and that said Petitioner could still bring in his own money (see 
affidavit of Merri l l B. Anderson) indicates, at least, a dispute as 
to this material fact and if taken in favor of the Petitioner as this 
Court has ruled it must (see Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity, etc. 
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and Thompson v. F o r d Motor C o . , ) supra , then the Court must 
find that the re is a ma te r i a l fact at i ssue and a l so it must follow 
that if the Trus t ee did, in fact, postpone the sale for 24 hours , 
then refuse to accept the offer from M e s s e r s Doxey and Belnap 
(see affidavit of M r . Doxey), he violated the statute and as a ma t t e r 
of law, the sale was invalid and Respondent, Midvalley Investment , 
cannot r ecove r on a motion for Summary Judgment . 
Even if th is Court defines the t e r m n For thwi th n loosely, 
or in a manner so a s to allow the T rus t ee additional t ime in which 
to make the sale - - how can it escape the fact that the sale did 
not, in fact, take place until the 17th day of January , 1975. 
(See affidavit of Ross and Helen Broadbent.) Hence, it follows that 
the T rus t ee should not have discouraged any bids until the sale was 
over . 
POINT III •' " ' 
THE ALLEGED SALE HELD ON JANURAY 16, 1975 WAS 
IMPROPER AS IT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE OFFICIAL NOTICE 
OF THE TRUSTEE, AND WAS SOLD IN VIOLATION THEREOF. 
The applicable statute is found at 57-1-25 , Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, which s t a tes a s follows: 
16 
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57-1-25 . Notice of t r u s t e e ' s sale - Descr ip t ion of 
p roper ty - Time and place of sa le , - - (1) The 
t r u s t e e shal l give wri t ten notice of the t ime and 
place of the sa le pa r t i cu la r ly descr ib ing the p r o -
per ty to be sold (a) by publication of such notice, 
at l eas t t h ree t i m e s , once a week for t h ree consecu-
tive weeks, the last publication to be at least ten 
days but not more than th i rdy days p r io r to the sa le , 
in some newspaper having a genera l c i rcula t ion in 
each county in which the p roper ty to be sold, or 
some par t thereof, is s i tuated, and (b) by posting 
such notice, at least twenty days before the date of 
sa le , in some conspicuous place on the proper ty to 
be sold and a lso in at least three public p laces of 
each precinct o r city in which the p roper ty to be sold, 
or some par t thereof, is s i tuated. 
(2) The sale shall be held at the t ime and place 
designated in the notice of sale which shal l be between 
the hours of 9 o'clock a . m . and 5 o'clock p . m . and 
at the courthouse of the county in which the p roper ty 
to be sold, o r some par t thereof, is s i tuated. 
(3) The notice of sale shal l be sufficient if made 
in substant ia l ly the following form: 
Notice of T r u s t e e ' s Sale 
The following descr ibed p roper ty will be sold at 
public auction to the highest bidder at the 
door of the county courthouse in 
County of , Utah, on , 19 , 
at o 'clock m. of said day: 
( insert descript ion) 
Pu rchase p r ice payable in lawful money of the United 
Sta tes . Dated , 19 . 
(Name of t rus tee ) 
The above essent ia l ly lays out the s ta tu tory r equ i rement s 
to the Trus t ee concerning the notice he must give. The notice 
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given by the Respondent Trustee, James Mason, is attached to 
his affidavit as Exhibit C. (See affidavit of James Mason.) 
The notice proclaims to the world that the following will 
occur: ' "' 
1 f
 A) That the sale is to be on January 16, 1975. 
r
 ' .' ,, ' »' ' '' ':- .J i -J . .U 'W i . .; V',j • • • . - . ' : ' . 
B) That it will be a public auction. 
t (• *. < f " • . • - . - . 
"
f
" C) That it will be to the highest bidder at time of sale. 
D) That the sale will be for cash at the time of sale. 
; According to the statute above, the Trustee did not need to 
require that the property be sold for "cash" nor did he need to 
require that it be "all payable at the time of the sale". But, at his 
own choosing, he published these requirements to the world in his 
notice, and at least Petitioner, Dorothy M. Anderson, believed 
them and did not attend the sale because she believed "cash" would 
be necessary on the spot. (See affidavit of Mrs . Dorothy M. 
Anderson.) 
The Respondents1 own affidavits clearly show that there were 
only two persons at the sale and that, in fact, "cash" was not paid 
on the 16th day of January, 1975 as was required by the notice. 
Also, the affidavit of Petitioner, Dorothy M. Anderson, indicates 
that her s is ter phoned Respondent, Capitol Thrift and Loan, with an 
i8 
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offer but was told she had to get the cash within 20 minutes. 
(See affidavit of Dorothy M. Anderson.) So it appears that the 
beneficiary also believed that "cash" would be required. 
It is submitted to this Court that on the face of it, the Trustee 
did publish to the world that "cash" would be required, and that 
cash had to be produced at the time of the sale - - January 16, 
1975. What other interpretation can be given from the document. 
Petitioners further submit that the Trustee is bound by his 
own notice. In the case of Kleckner v. Bank of America Nat'l 
Trust & Savings Association, et al, 217 P . 2d 28, 97 C.A. 2d 30, 
the District Court of Appeal, Division I, of California, held: 
at page 31 
Where realty was sold under a power of sale in 
second trust deed terms of which were prescribed 
in deed and recited in notice of sale as cash pay-
able at time of sale, trustee was justified in 
peremptorily demanding instantaneous payment in 
cash or entire amount bid on behalf of plaintiff 
owner of third trust deed, and trustee was not 
obligated to adjourn sale to afford bidder oppor-
tunity to obtain currency to meet bid, especially 
since plaintiff could have tendered amount due 
on second trust deed and terminated power of sale. 
Once sale under a trust deed has started it is 
duty of trustee to continue with reasonable dispatch, 
and, te rms being cash, trustee is not required to 
hold up sale while sundry bidders leave place to 
go to banks or elsewhere to get cash. 
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In Kleckner, supra, the Court dealt with the same 
problem that now faces this Court. The trustee had noticed up 
a sale of property under a trust deed. The notice of sale contained 
in it language identical to the notice before this Court, i . e . "cash 
in lawful money of the United States, payable at time of sale". 
(See Kleckner supra at pg.30) The trustee received a bid at the 
sale and accepted it. The bidder tendered him a check. Trustee 
refused it and requested "cash" as per the notice. Bidder then 
drove immediately to his bank and returned 15 to 20 minutes later 
with the cash. In the meantime, the trustee sold the property. The 
bidder brought the suit and the Court rejected his contention that 
the Trustee had acted improperly and said: 
(5) In execution sales it is the duty of the sheriff 
to require immediate payment in cash of the 
M bid. Kelly v. Bar net, 24 Cal. App. 119, 140 P . 
605. Civil Code Section 1657 provides that if an 
act consists in the payment of money only it must 
be performed immediately upon the thing to be 
done being exactly ascertained. InWiltsie, Real 
Property Mortgage Foreclosure, 5th Ed. , 1939, 
Vol. 2, at page 1081, appears the following: 
"But if any person other than the mortgagee be-
comes the purchaser, where the sale is for cash, 
he must comply strictly with the t e rms of sale, 
and pay the price bid in cash; a note to the party 
entitled to the proceeds of the sale is not cash, 
and the tender of such note will not be a compliance 
with the te rm of the sale. It has also been held 
that the officer may refuse to receive checks." 
(at page 31 of Kleckner, Supra) 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
v Petitioners respectfully submit that the Trustee was bound 
to accept "cash" as per the te rms of his notice. That if, in fact, 
he was willing to accept checks and allow time for bidders to come 
up with the price, then this should have been included in the notice, 
or at least the notice should have been silent on the subject. By 
requesting that "cash" be paid on the day of the sale, the Trustee 
stiffled competition and at least two known persons, Mrs . Dorothy 
M. Anderson and her sister , would have bid (See affidavit of Dorothy 
M. Anderson); and how many more unknown persons may have 
attended and bid had they known that "cash" was really not necessary 
on the day of the sale? 
These actions of the Trustee run contrary to law, as will 
be seen in C. J. S. Section 572 beginning at page 572: 
The mortgagee or trustee in selling the property, 
must act fairly and justly. Likewise, the mortgagee 
or trustee must act openly, reasonably, in good 
faith, with the strictest impartiality and integrity, 
with due or reasonable diligence, and in the exercise 
of sound discretion and of the caution and prudence 
which may fairly and reasonably be expected from a 
provident owner with respect to the sale of his own 
property. Accordingly, the mortgagee or trustee 
must exercise good faith and a just and fair dis-
cretion in protecting the rights and interest of the 
mortgager and others having an interest in the 
premises , using all reasonable efforts to make the 
sale beneficial to such parties by obtaining the full 
value of the property or the best price possible, or 
a reasonable amount. 
(with full annotations) 
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^ This fact of the law is also recognized in such a well-known 
authority on the subject as Thompson on Real Property (1957 replace-
ment) Section 5181 at page 241 wherein it is stated: 
The trustee, under a trust deed, must act fairly 
to protect all parties and use a sound discretion 
u
 to render the sale beneficial to the mortgager. 
And a majority of jurisdictions have followed the fact and 
rule of law that "the trustee is trustee for both debtor and creditor, 
and he must use the utmost good faith toward all, perform all duties 
with the strictest impartiality and look to the interest of both part ies." 
Bennett v. Union Bank, 5 Humph (24 Tenn.) 612.; Davenport 
v. Vaughn, 193 N. Car. 646, 137 S.E. 714 (liable for negligence); 
Simpson v. F ry , 194 N. Car . 623, 140 S. E. 295; Bell v. Scranton 
Trust Co. , 282 Pa. 562, 128 Atl. 494; Dillard v. Serpell, 138 Va. 
694, 123 S.E. 343; Schroeder v. Berlin Arcade Real Estate Co . , 175 
Wis. 79, 184 N.W. 542; Thomsen v. Genrich, 186 Wis. 76, 202 N. 
W. 168. See State v. Tidball, 35Wyo.496, 252 Pac. 499; Speers 
Sand & Clay Works, Inc. v. American Trust Co. . 20 Fed. (2d) 333; 
Davenport v. Vaughn. 193 N. Car. 646, 137 S.E. 714: Schroeder v. 
Berlin Arcade Real Estate Co. . 175 Wis, 79, 184 N.W. 542; Ainsa 
v. Mercantile Trust Co. , 174 Cal. 504, 163 Pac. 898;Brown v. 
Oriental University, 44 App. D.C. 414; Central Trust Co. v. Owsley, 
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188 111 A pp. 505; Hurs t Automatic Switch & Signal Co. v Trus t Co. 
(Mo.) , 216 S.W. 954; Hinton v. P r i t cha rd , 120 N. C a r . 1, 26 S.E. 
627, 58 Am. St. 768; Bell v. Scranton Trus t Co. , 282 Pa, 562, 128 
At l . 494; Har tman v. Evans , 38 W. Va. 669, 18 S .E. 810. 
Some Cour ts and author i t ies have even gone further and 
have declared that: 
Cour ts of equity, bacause of the possibi l i ty of abuse 
in this form of forec losure , jealously watch the 
sa les and a r e inclined to set them aside on slight 
proof of unfair conduct. 
Thompson on Real P rope r ty , supra , at page 230; Py v. P le i tner , 
70 Ca l . App. 2d. 28, 161 P . 2d 393; Reiser iberger v. Hankins, 
Tex. C . V . App. 258 S.W. 904. 
• • : - . . - • • . 0 - - ; . J O . , . * V , • • • - • • - • - . - •: • • • ' - • ; ' • • - ; " -
The Pe t i t ioners respectfully submit that the actions of the 
Trus t ee in adver t i s ing the p roper ty for sale in one manner and 
then sell ing it in another , was unfair and de t r imenta l to the P e t i -
t ioners here in inasmuch as it d iscouraged attendance and bids at 
the s a l e . This is con t ra ry to law, as cited above, and as a ma t t e r 
of law, the Respondent, Midvalley Investment, could not r ecove r 
a s u m m a r y judgment, based upon the actions of the T rus t ee . 
Pe t i t ioners respectfully request that the Summary Judgment 
be set as ide and the proper ty be re-not iced up and resold with the 
Trus tee ordered to accept a l l bids so as to obtain the best possible 
pr ice for the p roper ty . 
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..- ••••>. POINT IV . ; ,C---i.-'. ,y-.A ;> <•: ..!. 
THE ALLEGED SALE HELD ON JANUARY 16, 1975 WAS IM-
PROPER AND INEQUITABLE BECAUSE THE ACTS OF THE 
TRUSTEE AND BENEFICIARY COMBINED DISSUADED ATTEN-
DANCE AT THE SALE, AND THIS LED TO AN INADEQUATE 
PRICE. 
It is c l e a r under 57-1-29 that the T r u s t o r is entit led to 
any surp lus money for the sale af ter cos t s and indebtedness has 
been r e t i r ed . 
According to the evidence before the Third Dis t r i c t Court 
at the hear ing on the Summary Judgment , the one p roper ty alone 
on 11th Eas t was worth $70, 000. 00, (See las t page of affidavit of 
Dorothy M. Anderson . ) with no value being given for the other 
p roper ty . Pe t i t ioners 1 brief then had at tached to it a signed appra i sa l 
•*
]\ :h>V;
 c ; - v / : v n - . ( r . ; 
from one Gerald B . Higgs, a m e m b e r of the A m e r i c a n Society of 
A p p r a i s e r s , who indicated that the same proper ty was worth 
$98, 950.00. No appra i sa l was had on the home located at 474 Eas t 
12th Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
The affidavit of Ross Broadbent indicates he purchased the 
p rope r ty for $36 ,750 .00 . Even d i s regard ing the value of the ent i re 
p roper ty located at 474 Eas t 12th Avenue, it would appear from the 
evidence before the Third Dis t r ic t Court that the p roper ty was sold 
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for approximately fifty percent of its value. When the home 
at 474 East 12th Avenue is considered, then the amount received 
was wholly insufficient and inadequate. Petitioners respectfully 
point out that the actions of both the Trustee and Beneficiary in 
advising people they had to have "cash" at the time of the sale, 
then not selling for "cash", then continuing the sale for 24 hours, 
and still refusing to advise people of this and allowing them to bid --
constitutes the type of inequity that, when combined with the in-
adequate price, is sufficient to have the sale set aside. That the 
law so holds cannot be in doubt. InFoge v. Schmidt, 226 P. 2d 73, 
101 C.A. 2d 681, the court held: 
. . . but gross inadequacy of price coupled with 
even slight additional evidence of unfairness is 
sufficient to authorize setting the sale aside. 
This was followed Crofoot v. Tarman, 305 P . 2d 56, 147 
C.A. 2d 43: 
. . . but gross inadequacy of price in conjunc-
tion with irregularities which had the effect of 
conducing to the inadequacy of price or which 
have in some other way contributed to injury 
to trustor will afford such support. 
And the most recent case which Petitioners have found on 
the subject puts it very bluntly and states: 
Trial court may set aside a t rustee 's sale, 
under deed of trust , upon grounds of fraud 
or unfairness. 
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Nevada Land and Management C o . , v. Hidden Wel ls 
Ranch 435 P . 2d 198, 83 Nev. 501. The above fiat of the law 
is r e i t e r a t ed in C . J . S. Section 601 at pages 1051 and 1052 wherein 
a mi r i ad of c a s e s too numerous to review h e r e , es tabl ish the 
right and power of a court to set as ide a t rus t ee 1 s sale where the re 
has been inadequacy of p r ice coupled with c i r cums tances showing 
unfa i rness . ,-..^ '^ o . j ..-,- : , - ...;• •. j*<r • i:?, 
This being the case , then how could the Respondent, Mid-
valley, as a ma t t e r of law, (emphasis added) be entit led to a summary 
judgment. , : • ' . < : • • • . . • • : 
POINT V 
THE BENEFICIARY IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
AND THE TRUSTEE IS HIS AGENT. BENEFICIARY MAY NOT 
ACT IN SUCH A WAY SO AS TO INTERFERE WITH THE SALE AND 
PROHIBIT BIDDING AND ATTENDANCE. 
It is beyond dispute that under the t e r m s of a t r u s t deed, 
the T rus t ee ac t s upon the ins t ruc t ions of the beneficiary. While our 
s tatute covering t r u s t deeds , beginning at 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 , 
p e r m i t s the T r u s t e e to file notice of default, a s a p rac t i ca l ma t t e r , 
the t r u s t e e only does th is upon ins t ruct ions from the beneficiary. 
The t r u s t e e , in his own r ight , never knows when and if the mor tgager 
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is in default, as the payments to retire the indebtedness, for 
which the trust deed is given as security, is nearly always made 
to the beneficiary. Likewise, while our statutes permit the trustee 
to notice up the property and sell it, it is the beneficiary who 
instructs the trustee when to do so. Therefore, it cannot be said 
that the trustee acts in isolation of the beneficiary and the practi-
cal application of the business world would tend to indicate that in 
reality, they act in concert with the trustee acting upon the instructions 
of the beneficiary. This is especially true, where as in our Utah 
statute, the beneficiary appoints the trustee and may change him 
at will. Thus, in effect the trustee and beneficiary act as one and 
there is very little practical effect upon the regular mortgager-
mortgagee relationship by the insertion of a third person called the 
t rustee. 
Thompson on Real Property (1958 Replacement) at page 35, 
Section 4660, has this say about this relationship: 
In a number of jurisdictions the practice is follow-
ed of having the mortgager convey to a third per-
son as "trustee" for both the mortgager and the owner 
of the obligation which the trust deed secures. 
There is no magic in the fact that this is called a 
"deed". It still remains a mortgage with a power 
of sale but the addition of the power of sale no 
more changes the character of such an instrument 
than does a power of sale attached to any mortgage. 
(emphasis added) 
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; Thus, while the statutes in Utah were evidently passed to 
circumvent the difficulties inherent in the judicial foreclosure 
and sale of a mortgage - - the trust deed is, in fact, a mortgage 
and the beneficiary the mortgagee. Thus, the courts have held: 
The trustee in the deed of trust is not a trustee
 i r 
in the ordinary sense, but a mere functionary 
of a limited power acting as an agent for both 
the lender and the borrower. 
» i •-> • • "i - . , < . - . t . • • , . . , . , , f . . . . 
Fleisher v. Continental Auxiliary Co., 215CalApp. 2d 
136, 30 Cal Reptr 137. And again, with respect to the trustee-
beneficiary relationship, a federal court has held: 
But the ntrustees,f in a "deed of trust11 are, to a 
certain degree, in a fiduciary capacity with 
respect to the mortgager as well as the mort-
.•'••-.; gagee. So, in a deed of trust, the trustees may 
be liable in damages to the mortgager for 
t T breach of duty caused by their too close con-
nection to the mortgagee. 
Sheridan v. Perpetual Building Assn., 322 F 2d. 418 
Thus, where the trustee acts upon the instructions of the 
beneficiary, and the trustee is held to a strict standard of con-
duct by the courts, it must be that the beneficiary or mortgagee 
is held to the same standard. 
Thompson on Real Property, supra, makes this clear at 
Page 228, Section 5179, when he states: v * 
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Any act by the mortgagee which has tended to 
d i scourage bidding at the sale will invoke the 
protect ion of the equity cour t . 
Bracewel l v. Colman, 191 Ea . 35, 11 S.E. (2d) 198; 
Wil l iams v. Van Dam, 246 M a s s , 61 , 140 N . E . 265. 
It is c l e a r from the affidavit of M r s . Dorothy M. Anderson 
that her s i s t e r was advised by the mor tgagee , Capitol Thrift and 
Loan Company, that she would have to come up with the money in 
20 minutes in o r d e r to bid at the s a l e . (See affidavit of Dorothy M. 
Anderson , ) It is equally c l ea r that M r . Hill wanted to bid on the 
p roper ty and was told by the mor tgagee , Capitol Thrift and Loan, 
that he could not, (See affidavit of Mr . Hi l l . ) and this was a r ea l 
es ta te man who thought the p roper ty on 11th Eas t was worth $70,000.00 
alone. (Se e brief of Dorothy M. Anderson, last page). In addition, 
the t rus t ee turned down the bid of M e s s e r s Doxey and Belnap. (See 
affidavit of M r . Doxey and Belnap.) 
Pe t i t ioners respectfully submit that these combined actions 
of the t r u s t e e - mor tgagee worked to effect a poor attendance at the 
sale and a l so a lower p r i ce on the bid than could otherwise have been 
obtained. Under the law, these act ions of the t ru s t ee and mortgagee 
should have precluded the granting of the motion for Summary Judg-
ment and this Court should o r d e r the proper ty to be re-noticed and 
r e - so ld in o rder for a fair and equitable sa le , and should set the 
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Summary Judgment a s ide . .,*< • :n*v *
 it r .... i 
i • ; - ^ v : : i . i n . . : • • - • • . , , >:, :.. : ; M ? ' • - 0 • 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion then, the th rus t of the Pe t i t ioners 1 case is 
that they have not been dealt with fair ly and a be t ter p r ice could 
have been obtained at the sa l e . 
Thei r case i s made up of a s e r i e s of ac t s and omiss ions 
by the t r u s t e e and mortgagee which, when taken alone and isolated, 
• • ' , * ' 
may not be sufficient to void the sa le , but when taken together , 
worked a g r o s s inequity upon the P e t i t i o n e r s . These ac t s and 
omiss ions a r e as follows: 
A) The notice requi r ing cash on the day of the s a l e . 
B) Actually not receiving cash , but allowing Midvalley 
Investment to come in 24 hours l a t e r . 
C) T r u s t e e ' s refusal to en te r ta in bids from Doxey and 
Belnap, just p r i o r to accepting a check from Midvalley Inves tment . 
D) The inequity of the p r i ce as against the value of the 
p rope r ty . 
E) The d i s suad ing and refusal to allow M r . Hill to bid 
by mor tgagee . 
F) The ins is tance by mortgagee that M r s . Anderson 1 s 
s i s t e r get the money in 20 minutes in o r d e r to bid. 
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It is respectfully submitted that these acts, taken as a 
whole, worked an inequity upon the Petitioners. An inequity so 
great as to require the intervention of this Court to set aside the 
Summary Judgment heretofore granted, and to order that the 
property be re-noticed up and re-sold at a public sale so that a 
fairer value may be obtained for it. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Graham Dodd 
Attorney for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of August, 1975, I 
personally served copies of the Petitioners1 foregoing Brief 
upon attorneys for Respondents, Ralph R. Mabey and Robert D. 
Merri l l , by leaving copies of the same at their respective 
offices. 
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